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ALAN ELLIS*
ROBERT L. PISANIt

The United States Treaties On Mutual
Assistance In Criminal Matters:
A Comparative Analysis
I. Introduction

With the shrinking of international borders that has occurred since the
end of the Second World War, more and more concern has been focused
within the United States on the problems of transnational criminality and
ways to combat it. The traditional manner of seeking judicial assistance
from a foreign country, that of letters rogatory, 1 however, has grown into a
cumbersome and time-consuming process involving diplomatic personnel,
the home offices and courts of the respective countries, and private counsel
who must be hired, often at great expense, to press the claims of the
requesting countries. 2 The difficulty in obtaining foreign evidence or testimony material to a U.S. investigation has been a source of frustration to
U.S. officials, who have on occasion resorted to attempts to enforce U.S.
subpoenas in foreign jurisdictions 3 and the use of extra-legal methods such
*Alan Ellis is Chair of the Subcommittee on Extradition of the American Bar Association
Section of Criminal Justice's Committee on Immigration, Extradition and International Criminal Law and a practicing attorney with International Legal Defense Counsel in Philadelphia.
tRobert L. Pisani is Executive Director of International Legal Defense Counsel.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1050 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines letters rogatory as "[tihe
medium whereby one country, acting through one of its courts, requests another thereto and
entirely within the latter's control, to assist the administration of justice in the former country."
For the form of a letters rogatory, see 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 28.05; also UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY MANUAL, Title 9, Ch. 4, p. 77.
2. See Mutual Legal Assistance With the Republic of Colombia, S. REP. No. 35, 97th Cong.
1st Sess., 1981, p. 8 (hereinafter "Colombian Report").
3. A good example of the difficulties which U.S. authorities face in attempting to enforce
U.S. subpoenas in foreign jurisdictions is provided in the Marc Rich case, which involved the
investigation of Marc Rich and Company, A.G., a Swiss Corporation, and two U.S. nationals
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as the "kidnapping" of information 4 in order to achieve their ends. Treaties
on mutual assistance in criminal matters are relatively new developments
from the perspective of the United States and offer a means by which
judicial cooperation can be greatly enhanced. The rapid proliferation of
these treaties over the course of the next several years dictate a need on the
part of scholars and the international practitioner to understand their nature
and functioning. A discussion of these treaties is especially timely, since the
United States Senate recently gave its advice and consent to the most recent
treaties between the United States and Italy and Morocco. This article
provides an overview of the contents of the three treaties on mutual assistance in criminal matters presently in force between the United States and
Switzerland ("Swiss Treaty"), 5 Turkey ("Turkish Treaty") 6 and the Netherlands ("Netherlands Treaty"), 7 and also with those presently signed but not
who were alleged to have engaged in transfer-pricing involving a U.S. oil-trading company and
its Swiss parent. See Marc Rich & Co., A. G. v. United States of America, 707 F.2d 663 (2nd
Cir. 1983), cert. denied 103 S.Ct. 3555 (1983); Marc Rich & Co., A. G. v. United States of
America, 736 F.2d. 864 (2nd Cir. 1984), discussed infra at note 166 et. seq. See also The Marc
Rich Saga: Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law-A Growing Legal and Diplomatic
Problem, paper presented by Bruce Zagaris, partner, Berliner and Maloney, Washington,
D.C., at "New Horizons in. International Criminal Law", Conference sponsored by International Institute for the Study of Higher Criminal Sciences, Siracusa, Italy, May 6-11, 1984. See
also Zagaris, Harwood, and Goldsworth, The U.S. and U.K. Lock Horns Over a U.S.
Transfer-Pricing Criminal Investigation, 44 TAXES INT'L 3-18 (June, 1983); U.S. Court of
Appeals Orders a Swiss Corporation With No. U.S. Office to Deliver Documents to a U.S.
Grand-Juryin New York City in a CriminalTransfer-PricingInvestigation, excerpts from In Re
Grand-Jury Proceedings; U.S. v. Marc Rich and Co. AG, 44 TAXES INT'L 11-18 (June, 1983);
Zagaris, Marc Rich Caves In, 46 TAXES INT'L 55-57 (August, 1983); Zagaris, Marc Rich and
Similar Cases Prompt Other Countriesto Assert Their Sovereignity, 48 TAXES INT'L 3-6 (October, 1983); Zagaris, Developments in InternationalEnforcement 49 TAXES INT'L 3-4 (November, 1983).
The United States recently concluded an agreement with Great Britain that would give
American officials investigating narcotic offenses information about secret bank accounts in the
Cayman Islands. In return, the U.S. agreed not to attempt to enforce Federal subpoenas to
obtain bank records. See "Exchange of letters between the government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America
concerning the Cayman Islands and matters connected with, arising from, related to, or
resulting from any narcotics activity referred to in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
1961, as amended by the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961"
(hereinafter "Executive Agreement"), copy provided by Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State. See also Islands' Bank Secrecy Is Lifted for U.S., July 27, 1984, p. 3. At the same
time, U.S. courts are becoming more sympathetic to the issuance of subpoenas to obtain
foreign bank and tax information. See Courts Aid Officials' Efforts to Get Offshore Bank Data
of U.S. Firms, The Wall St. J., July 24, 1984.
4. See Tigar and Doyle, "International Exchange of Information in Criminal Cases",
in TransnationalAspects of Criminal Procedure, 1983 MICH. Y.B. OF INT'L LEGAL STUDIES

p. 77-78.
5. Treaty With the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters with
related notes. Signed at Bern May 25, 1973, entered into force January 23, 1977. 27 UST 2019,
T.I.A.S. 8302.
6. Treaty With the Republic of Turkey on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters. Signed at Ankara June 7, 1979; entered into force on January 1, 1981. T.I.A.S. 9891.
7. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Signed at the
Hague on June 12, 1981; entered into force on September 15, 1983. T.I.A.S. No. 70734.
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yet in force between the United States and Colombia ("Colombian
Treaty"), 8 Italy ("Italian Treaty"), 9 and Morocco ("Moroccan Treaty").' °
II. Background
A.

TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL RELUCTANCE

For many years U.S. judicial authorities were reluctant to grant judicial

assistance in criminal matters. Such reluctance was based on a number of
factors, including concern over the old conflict of law rule that the criminal
law of one nation will not give effect to the criminal law of another, 1 the
more general doubt about the common law duty or power of courts to grant
judicial assistance to foreign courts in criminal matters, and the right of the
accused to be confronted by the witness against him. There may have been
additional reasons for this reluctance, including the fact that American

judicial authorities were merely ignorant or suspicious of foreign

tribunals. 12 Mueller, writing in 1962, stated that "as far as criminal cases are
concerned, the American common law doctrine is to the effect that the

power to execute letters rogatory or a commission issued by a foreign court
'is confined to civil suits and does not extend to criminal proceedings;
criminal law being strictly local and a subject to which the comity of states
3
does not extend.'"'

The initial U.S. basis for judicial assistance to proceedings in foreign
countries was set out by the Act of March 2, 1855, stating that "Where
letters rogatory have be[been] addressed, from any court of a foreign

country to any circuit court of the United States, and a United States
commissioner designated by said circuit court to make the examination of
witnesses in said letters mentioned, said commissioner shall be empowered
to compel the witness to appear and depose in the same manner as to appear
8. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance with the Republic of Colombia. Signed at Washington
on August 20, 1980; approved by the Senate on January 4, 1982; not yet in force.
9. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters with the Italian Republic. Signed at
Rome on November 9, 1982; advice and consent of the U.S. Senate given on June 29, 1984; not
yet in force.
10. Convention between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed at Rabat on October 17, 1983; advice and
consent of the U.S. Senate given on June 29, 1984; not yet in force.
An additional treaty was signed with Uruguay in 1973 but has never come into force. See
Treaty on Extradition and Cooperation in Penal Matters, April 6, 1973, S.Exec. Doc. K, 93rd
Congress, 1st Session. The Treaty was ratified by the United States on November 21, 1973, but
never ratified by Uruguay. This article will not discuss the more limited mutual assistance
treaties known collectively as the "Lockheed Agreements." For a discussion, see Ristau,
International Cooperation in Penal Matters: The "Lockheed Agreements," in Transnational
Aspects of Criminal Procedure, supra note 4, at 85-104.
11. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
12. One authority seemed to feel it was a little of all of these factors. See Mueller, International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters, 7 VILL. L. REV. 196, 197, 198 (1962).
13. Mueller, supra note 12, at 204, citing In the Matter of Jenckes 6 R.I. 18, 21 (1859).
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and testify in court. ' 14 A later Act of March 3, 1863 made the 1855 Act
largely obsolete, and limited judicial assistance to certain civil actions by
permitting "testimony of any witness residing within the United States to be
used in any suitfor the recovery of money orproperty depending in any court

in any foreign country with which the United States are at peace, and in
which the government of such foreign country shall be a party or shall have
an interest ... 5 (emphasis added). The same Act also permitted letters
rogatory to be used by U.S. courts for use in foreign countries, permitting
them to be returned through the "ministers or consuls of the U.S. nearest
16
the place where said letters or commission shall have been executed.'
B. MAJOR REVISIONS

The next major revision of the U.S. law on international judicial
assistance' 7 occurred in 1948 and permitted "the deposition of any witness
14. Act of March 2, 1855, Ch. 140, § 2, 9 Stat 630.
15. Act of March 3, 1863, Chapter 95, § 1, 12 Stat 769. Jones, writing in 1953, noted that
ironically the original 1855 Act was enacted to enable a federal circuit court to examine a
witness on behalf of a French juge d'instruction, which is a magistrate sitting in a preliminary
criminal proceeding, but that the subsequent enactment of the 1863 Act limiting assistance to
money suits in which the government had an interest not only obsoleted the 1855 Act but also
severely limited the assistance U.S. courts could offer. See Jones, InternationalJudicialAssistance: ProceduralChaos and a Programfor Reform 62 YALE L.J. 540-541 (1953). Jones felt that
it was not until the adoption of the 1949 amendment permitting assistance in "judicial proceedings" that Congress once again clearly indicated that criminal matters were to be included
in such assistance. Id.
16. See supra note 15, at § 4. The U.S. was required to either be a party or have an interest in
the matter.
17. Earlier amendments permitted the witness to answer only to the specific questions
contained in the letters rogatory (Act of March 3, 1873, Ch. 245, § 1, 17 Stat 581, a right which
could be waived upon consent of the Parties); granted the right against self-incrimination with
respect to answering questions contained in the letters rogatory (Id. § 2, such right to be secured
"either under the laws of the State or Territory within which such examination is had, or any
other, foreign State"); and permitted commissioners of circuit courts of the United States to
whom letters rogatory had been addressed to compel witnesses to "appear and depose in the
same manner as witnesses may be compelled to appear and testify in courts" (Act of February
27, 1877, Ch. 69, 19 Stat. 241). This amendment was precisely the wording of the original 1855
legislation, and was subsequently appended to the Revised Statutes § 875 (2d. Ed., 1878). One
year later, the Revised Statutes §§ 4071-4073 drew on the 1863 and 1873 Acts and set forth more
limited circumstances in which a foreign government could seek the aid of U.S. courts, i.e. suits
involving money or property in which the foreign nation was a party or had an interest. The
statutes remained separate but apparently equal until 1948 when they were revised and
consolidated into 28 U.S.C. § 1781 et. seq. (62 Stat. 949). See In re Letters Rogatory From the
Justice Court, District of Montreal, Canada, 523 F. 2d note 5 at 564 (1975). Later, when circuit
courts were abolished, this power passed to the newly created district courts (Act of March 3,
1911, Ch. 231, § 291, 36 Stat 1167).
By 1926, the courts were permitted to issue subpoenas through consular officers to U.S.
citizens abroad who refused to appear in a foreign court pursuant to a letters rogatory issued by
a U.S. court in order to compel them to appear. Act of July 3, 1926, Ch. 762, § 1, 44 Stat 835.
The same Act permitted U.S. courts to issue subpoenas through consular officers to U.S.
citizens abroad who were needed as witnesses at a criminal trial, commanding the witness to
appear at the said court at a specified date and time. If the witness refused to appear as directed,
VOL. 19, NO. 1
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residing within the United States to be used in any civil actionpending in any
court in a foreign country . . . . [to] be taken before a person authorized to
administer oaths designated by the district court of any district where the
witness resides or may be found."' 8 This broadened the law to include any
civil action and dropped the requirement that the United States "be a Party
or have an interest" in the suit. However, Congress apparently meant to
allow such inquiries with regard to other proceedings as well, because the
next year the phrase "civil action" was struck out of the law and the phrase
"judicial proceeding" inserted in lieu thereof. 19
The 1948 and 1949 amendments represented the beginnings of a change in
U.S. attitudes toward international judicial assistance. A decade earlier, in
1938, the Department of Justice and the Harvard Law School's Research in
International Law Project published critiques of the problems in obtaining
international judicial assistance, the Harvard Project going so far as to
publish a draft treaty on International Judicial Assistance. 20 The American
Bar Association passed a resolution in 1950 urging the federal government
to "draf[t] treaties and tak[e] other such action as may appear advisable to
codify and improve international procedures in civil and criminal
matters. ' '2 1 In the early 1950's, the U.S. military adhered to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's Status of Forces Agreement. 22 The treaty
requires mutual assistance between the host and visiting country, including
investigation in criminal matters. However, the treaty is restricted to
offenses committed by members of the military.
In 1958, in response to increasing problems with international judicial
assistance, Congress established the Commission and Advisory Committee
on International Rules of Judicial Procedure to study means of improving
such assistance.2 3 The Commission proposed and Congress later passed an
24
entire revision of the statutes governing international judicial assistance.
U.S. courts were empowered to "order service upon [a resident of the
district] of any document issued in connection with a proceeding in a foreign
the court was empowered to issue an order directing the witness to appear and show cause why
he should not be held in contempt. The court was also permitted to seize property of the witness
to be held to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against him, and such person was
subject to a maximum fine of $100,000 upon a finding of contempt. Id. §§ 4-7.
18. Act of June 25, 1948, Ch. 646, 62 Stat 949. See also Martin, InternationalJudicial
Assistance-Letters Rogatory-FederalCourts Are to Grant Assistance Only To Those Foreign
Bodies That Qualify As Tribunals, under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 9 TEX. INT'L L. J. 108 (1974).
19. Act of May 24, 1949, Ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103.
20. Draft Convention on JudicialAssistance,Harvard Law School, Research in International
Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supplement), 1939; see also Jones, supra note 15, at 558 (1953).
21. 75 ABA Rep. 150 (1950), quoted in Jones, supra note 15, at note 146.
22. Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their
forces. Signed at London, June 19, 1951, entered into force for the United States August 23,
1953. 4 U.S.T. 1792; T.I.A.S. 2846; 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
23. Act of September 2, 1958, P. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743.
24. Act of October 3, 1964, P.L. No. 88-619, 78 Stat. 995.
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or international tribunal.", 25 The new law also permitted the Department of
State to receive and transmit letters rogatory. 26 No distinction was made
between civil and criminal cases for the purposes of the State Department's
handling of the requests for judicial assistance. Most important of all, it was
made clear under a revised Section 1782 of Chapter 28 that judicial assistance may be sought not only to compel testimony and statements but also to
require the production of documents and other tangible evidence:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him
to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use
in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order may be made
pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international
tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the
testimony or statement be given, or the 27document or other thing be produced,
before a person appointed by the court.
Up until this time the U.S. Department of State would not aid in the
transmission of requests from a foreign court, including letters rogatory;
such requests had to be forwarded directly to the appropriate courts via
consular officers of the country in which the letters rogatory were to be
used.2 8
Though the 1964 amendments unquestionably "broadened and liberalized" United States practice in international judicial assistance, 29 letters
rogatory have been consistently criticized as being "cumbersome, time
consuming and extremely limited" ;30 the cost of hiring an attorney to press a
foreign letters rogatory has been described as "astronomical" and "one of
the major stumbing blocks to obtaining evidence abroad."' 3' One authority
has noted that "foreign letters rogatory are often unsatisfying, if not incomprehensible to American lawyers, because investigating magistrates are
accustomed to writing for a reader who is another investigating magistrate, ,,32 and that, "By the same token, American letters rogatory are
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. § 4, 28 U.S.C. 1696
Id. § 8, 28 U.S.C. 1781
Id. § 9, 28 U.S.C. 1782
Mueller, supra note 12,

(1976).
(1976).
(1976).
at 202.

29. See Senate Report 1580, 1964, reproduced in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, p.
3782. See also In Re Letters Rogatory From Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216 (9th
Cir. 1976).
30. Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 2; Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance With the

Kingdom of the Netherlands, S. REP. No. 36, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1981, p. 2 (hereinafter
"Netherlands Report"); Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance With the Republic of Morocco,

S. REP. No. 35, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1984, p. 2 (hereinafter "Moroccan Report"); Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty With Italy, S. REP. No. 36, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1984, p. 2 (hereinafter "Italian Report").
31. Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 8.

32. Chamblee, Larry; Senior Trial Attorney, Office of International Affairs, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice. International Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases, in
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND ACCOMODATIONS, Vol.

I, 1984, p. 188 (hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION).
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especially opaque to33foreign judges, who do not have an inkling of American
law or procedure."

C. 1964

AMENDMENT

Problems have also arisen concerning the wording of the statutes. The

1964 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 replaced the language "any judicial
proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country" with "in a proceeding
in a foreign or international tribunal." Considerable debate and litigation
has occurred over the precise meaning of the phrase "tribunal"; judicial
pronouncements have indicated that the assistance sought must be for use in
a foreign judicial tribunal, and cannot merely be an administrative
proceeding.34 Additionally, the wording of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 indicates that
such assistance is at the court's discretion, a fact that has been upheld by the
courts. 35 Such rulings have not been looked upon favorably either by foreign

bodies seeking assistance or by U.S. authorities concerned about the principle of comity.
In the past, U.S. courts have not looked with favor upon the use of letters
rogatory to secure evidence for introduction in criminal investigations or
cases. 36 Whether such assistance could be granted in criminal cases was not
33. Id.
34. In Re Letters Rogatory Issued by Director of Inspection of the Government of India, 385
F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967) (Superintendent of Exchange Control of Colombia not a "tribunal"
since he acts in government interest); In Re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses From the
Court of Queen's Bench For Manitoba, Canada, 488 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1973) (Canadian
Commission of Inquiry not a "tribunal" since its work is unrelated to judicial or quasi-judicial
controversies); In Re Letters Rogatory From Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216 (9th
Cir. 1976) (Tokyo District Court is entitled to international judicial assistance despite contention that Court, while not acting as an adjudicatory body, was not a "tribunal"); Fonseca v.
Blumenthal 620 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1980) (Indian Income Tax officer not a "tribunal" since he
acts in government interest). See also Note, JudicialAssistance: Obtaining Evidence i4i the
United States, under 28 U.S. C. § 1782, for Use in a Foreign or InternationalTribunal, 5 B.C.
INT'L CoMp. L.R. 175-193 (1982). The mutual assistance treaties circumvent this problem by
authorizing U.S. courts to use all of their usual powers to issue subpoenas or any other process
in order to satisfy a request for assistance under the treaties. See e.g. Colombian Treaty Article
4(1); Italian Treaty Article 4(1); Turkish Treaty Article 25(4), Moroccan Treaty Article 3(1),
requiring the requested State to do everything in their power to execute the request.
35. In Re Request for Judicial Assistance from Seoul District Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea,
555 F.2d 720 (C.A. Cal. 1977); In Re Letters Rogatory From Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539
F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976).
Other problems with letters rogatory have included the lack of an internationally accepted
model to specify the requisite information, inadequate oversight of their execution by diplomatic personnel, a lack of specified procedures for taking testimonial evidence in the requested
State, and a lack of mandatory procedures regarding authentication of foreign public documents. See Abbell, InternationalAssistance in Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions, in
EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION, New York, Practicing Law Institute, 1984, pp. 231-32.
36. See In Re Letters Rogatory From First District Judge of Vera Cruz, 36 F. 306 (CCSDNY,
1888); In Re Letters Rogatory of Republic of Colombia, 4 F.Supp. 165 (SDNY 1933); In Re
WINTER 1985
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to be become definitive case law until 1975, when the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled in In Re Letters Rogatory From Justice
Court, District of Montreal, Canada that requests for execution of letters
rogatory could apply to criminal as well as civil matters. 37 By then, the 1964
amendments had been in place for some time and because of the lack of
judicial precedent granting a letters rogatory in a criminal case reliance was
made wholly upon the legislative history and intent. 38 The Court of
Appeals, in granting the request, noted that the Senate Report on the 1964
amendments stated that the enactment of the word "tribunal" in place of
"court" indicated that "assistance should be available, in the court's discre39
tion, in connection with criminal proceedings abroad."

D.

THE FIRST U.S. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS TREATY

In 1962, the Council of Europe's European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters came into force. 40 The European Convention was
to play a major role in assisting the U.S. in the later drafting of the Swiss
Treaty, and subsequently the other mutual assistance treaties. A Conference on International Judicial Assistance, which was attended by a number
of U.S. and Italian authorities, was held in Italy in August, 1961. During
that Conference a resolution was adopted urging the creation of a bilateral
research commission to consider utilization of the principles embodied in
the European Convention with a view toward the making of a Convention
for Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United States and
Italy.41
Despite these good intentions, no serious negotiations were initiated until
a series of criminal prosecutions in the United States in the 1960's revealed
that Swiss secrecy laws regarding banking were being used to protect a
Letters Rogatory From Examining Magistrate of Tribunal of Versailles, France, 26 F. Supp.

852 (D. Md. 1939). Chamblee has noted that amendments to the U.S. statutes in 1948 and 1949
provided the authority to grant assistance in criminal matters. Chamblee supra note 32, at 210.
37. 383 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd 523 F.2d. 562 (6th Cir. 1975).
38. Id. at 565. This was also the procedure of the lower court, which could find no precedent
where a letters rogatory had been granted in a criminal case, supra note 37, at 858.
39. Supra note 37, at 565, quoting the Senate Report.
40. European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, entered into force
June 12, 1962, European Treaty Series No. 30 (hereafter "European Convention"). The
European Convention is presently in force between Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Israel and Finland. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CHART
SHOWING SIGNATURES

AND

RATIFICATIONS

OF COUNCIL

OF EUROPE

CONVENTIONS

AND

Strasbourg, November 15, 1982. A Protocol was signed and came into effect on
April 12, 1982. The European Convention in turn was based in part on bilateral treaties
AGREEMENTS,

concluded between member states of the Council. See Mueller, supra note 12, at 194.
41. Elliott, CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE; JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
SERIES, INSTITUTE ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 9-U-14 (1961), at 13. Cited in Mueller, supra

note 12, at 223.
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variety of illegal activities, including avoidance of American security laws,
evasion of American taxes, and the financing of organized crime activities.4 2
One of the cornerstones of Swiss law is its strong concern for the privacy of
the individual, a concern which extends to banking transactions, including
those of foreigners. Unauthorized disclosure of financial information cre43
ates a civil and criminal liability under the Swiss Federal Banking Law.
The Swiss Penal Code also prohibits disclosure of business secrets, including
disclosure to foreign authorities. 44 While an earlier treaty, the 1951 U.S.Swiss Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to
Taxes on Income,4 5 permitted American authorities to obtain information
necessary to prevent fraud against U.S. tax laws, few disclosures of tax fraud
have been made under the Convention and it has been of no assistance in
other criminal matters.46 With the growing concern of U.S. prosecutorial
interests extending beyond fiscal offenses and into the area of white collar
crime and transactions of multinational corporations, the U.S. sought to
negotiate a broader treaty.
In November, 1968, discussions were begun with Swiss authorities on
these issues. 47 An impasse soon developed over the Swiss reluctance to
compromise their views on fiscal privacy in matters they did not consider a
crime, such as tax evasion. The impasse was resolved when the U.S.
dropped its request for information on tax evaders. 48 The treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters was signed in May, 1973 and came into force
in January, 1977. 4 9 Perhaps because of the complicated banking laws in-

42. Treaty With the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters, Senate
Executive Report No. 94-29, 94th Congress, 2d Session, 1976, p. 1.
43. See Tigar and Doyle, supra note 4, at 64; Meier, Banking Secrecy in Swiss and International Taxation 7 INT'L LAW. at 19, note 16 (1973); Bloem, "Criminal Law-Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the United States and Switzerland" 7 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. note 1 at 469 (1974); Johnson, JudicialAssistance-CriminalProcedure-Treaty
With Switzerland Affects Banking Secrecy Law-ProvisionsAgainst Organized Crime Set New
Precedent, 15 HARV. J. INT'L L. 360-64 (1974).

44. Tigar and Doyle, supra note 4, at 64; Meier, supra note 43, at note 5.
45. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income.
Signed at Washington May 24, 1951, entered into force September 27, 1951. 2 U.S.T. 1751,
T.I.A.S. 2316, 127 U.N.T.S. 227, Article 16. See also Tigar and Doyle, supra note 4, at 65. The
Convention has been discussed extensively elsewhere and need not concern us here. See Meier,
supra note 43; see also Kronauer, Information Given for Tax Purposes From Switzerland to
Foreign Countries Especially to the United States for the Prevention of Fraud and the Like in
Relation to Certain American Taxes, 30 TAX L. REV. 47 (1974).
46. See Bloem, supra note 43, at 473.
47. Treaty With The Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters, S. REP.
No. 29, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., 1976, p. 1 .
48. Id. p. 2. The Treaty, however, was amended in 1983 by changes in the Swiss legislation to
allow for legal assistance in cases of tax or customs fraud for individuals other than organized
crime figures. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
49. For the Swiss implementing legislation see Federal Law on the Treaty with the United
States of America on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, entered into force on October 3,
WINTER 1985
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volved in the negotiations and the fact that it was the first mutual assistance

in criminal matters treaty negotiated by the United States, the Swiss-U.S.
Treaty is the longest and most complicated of any of the mutual assistance
treaties presently negotiated by the U.S.
II. The Treaties on Mutual Legal Assistance with Switzerland, Turkey,
the Netherlands, Colombia, Italy and Morocco
A.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

While the exact wording of the treaties differ from treaty to treaty, their
essential thrust does not. All provide for a broad range of assistance in
criminal matters, including: (1) executing requests relating to criminal matters; (2) taking of testimony or statement of persons; (3) effecting the
production, preservation and authentication of documents, records, or
articles of evidence; (4) returning to the requesting party any objects,
articles or any other property or assets belonging to it or obtained by the
accused through offenses; (5) serving judicial documents, writs, summonses, records of judicial verdicts and court judgments or decisions; (6)
effecting the appearance of a witness or expert before a court of the request-

ing party; (7) locating persons; and (8) providing judicial records, evidence
and information. 50 In addition, the Swiss Treaty offers assistance with

respect to compensation for damages incurred by a person through unjus1975 (hereinafter "Swiss Implementing Legislation"), English language copy provided by U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division.
For the general Swiss legislation on mutual assistance, see Switzerland: Law on International
JudicialAssistance in Criminal Matters, XX I.L.M. 1339 (1980) (hereinafter "Swiss Law").
Of course, many other difficult matters had to be dealt with, including the conflict of law
problem between the procedures and philosophies of civil and common law countries. See
Markees, The Difference in Concept Between Civil and Common Law CountriesAs To Judicial
Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal Matters, in A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, Bassiouni and Nanda (eds.), Volume 2, 1973, pp. 171-188.
50. See Swiss Treaty, Article 1(4), 11, 16, 19, 20, 22; Turkish Treaty Article 21; Colombian
Treaty Article 1; Netherlands Treaty Articles 1 and 2; Italian Treaty Article 1; Moroccan
Treaty Article 1. See also Colombian report, supra note 2, at 1; Netherlands Report, supra note
30, at 1; Italian Report, supra note 30, at 1; Moroccan Report, supra note 30, at 1; Letter of
Transmittal of President Jimmy Carter to the Senate concerning the Treaty with the Republic of
Turkey on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, S. REP. No. 18, U.S.
Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, DC, US GPO, 1979, p. 11 1 (hereinafter "Turkish
Report").
The Swiss Treaty contains a Schedule listing 35 categories of offenses which constitute crimes
in both countries and to which the Parties would be required to lend assistance. In addition to
common law crimes such as murder, theft, and rape, the Schedule also lists forgery and
counterfeiting, drug violations, gambling and bookmaking operations, fraud in relation to
running a business, and other crimes including conspiracy to commit such offenses. The treaty is
supplemented by seven exchanges of letters interpreting language used in several of the Articles
dealing with testimony to authenticate documents, limitations on use of information, the duty
to testify in the requested State, service of documents, protection of secrecy, and the taking of
oaths. After the Swiss Treaty came into effect, a much simplified model treaty was drafted by
the Department of State. See M. NASH, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1978, 859-65 (1980).
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tified detention as a result of action taken pursuant to the Treaty. 51 The
Italian Treaty also provides for assistance in "immobilizing and forfeiting
assets"; the Moroccan
has a similar clause relating to confiscation of nar52
cotic-related assets.
Double criminality 53 is specifically required only in the Swiss Treaty,
which also requires that the offense be listed in the schedule of offenses at
the end of the Treaty. 54 However, under Article 4(3) of the Treaty assist-

ance can be given even if the offense is not listed in the schedule, providing
dual criminality exists and the requested State finds the offense to be of
sufficient gravity to warrant assistance. The treaties negotiated with Co-

lombia and Italy both have a clause stating that assistance shall be rendered
even when the act under investigation is not an offense in the requested
State; 55 though not specifically stated, this is also implied in the Netherlands
Treaty. 56
All the treaties provide that the contracting parties shall provide mutual
assistance in criminal investigations and proceedings,57 implying that assist-

ance will be rendered regardless of whether any charges have been filed. The
stated desire to provide assistance in criminal investigations and proceedings indicate that such assistance could be made available at both the
investigatory and trial stages; this would include grand jury proceedings in

the United States. 58 The emphasis on administrative investigations indicates
that agencies in foreign countries could share with the United States such
51. Swiss Treaty Article 1(1).
52. Italian Treaty Articles 1(2) (g), 18; Moroccan Treaty Article 12. Though it is not
specifically stated in the Swiss Treaty, Swiss law does provide that bank assets can be frozen and
forfeited to the appropriate canton. See Cardenas v. Smith, 555 F. Supp. 539 (D.C.1982),
discussed infra at 138 and accompanying text.
53. Shearer defines double criminality as "an act . . . [which] constitutes a crime according
to the laws of both the requesting and requested States." Shearer, EXTRADmON IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1971, p. 137.
54. Swiss Treaty Article 4. The double criminality and listing in the Schedule of offenses
requirement are both waived in the case of organized crime investigations, discussed infra at
111-115 and accompanying text.
55. Colombian Treaty Article 1(3); Italian Treaty Article 1(3). However, dual criminality is
a prerequisite to obtaining a search warrant under the Italian Treaty, which will be used to
obtain documents and records in that country since Italy lacks a process equivalent to a
subpoena duces tecum. Italian Report, supra note 30, at 8.
56. Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 2, 3. An exception exists with regard to search and
seizure offenses, which require double criminality and that the offense be punishable by a term
of imprisonment for more than one year or less if they are listed in the Annex to the Treaty.
Netherlands Treaty Article 6(1). The Moroccan Treaty was deliberately silent on this point,
with the understanding that the judiciary in each country may or may not require double
criminality in accordance with each country's domestic law and practice. Moroccan Report,
supra note 30, at 4.
57. Swiss Treaty Article 1(1) (a); Netherlands Treaty Article 1(1); Turkish Treaty Article
21(2); Colombian Treaty Article 1(1); Italian Treaty Article 1(1); Moroccan Treaty Article
1(1).
58. Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 1; Swiss Treaty Article 31(2); Italian Report, supra
note 30, at 1; Moroccan Report, supra note 30, at 1.
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data as the movement of suspected drug traffickers, which was one of the
prime objectives of the treaties. 59 In addition to mutual assistance in criminal matters, the Colombian Treaty also provides for mutual assistance in
civil and administrative investigations and proceedings, a provision found in
the Swiss Treaty and implied in the Netherlands, Italian and Moroccan
Treaties. 60 The more recent treaties, i.e., those with Italy, Morocco, the
Netherlands and Colombia, contain no requirement that the matter under
investigation in the requesting State be one which falls or would fall within
the jurisdiction of that State, 6' while the earlier treaties with Switzerland
62
and Turkey do contain such a provision.
On the United States side, the treaties are all intended to be selfexecuting, relying on the existing authority of the federal courts, particularly
28 U.S.C. § 1782.63 The treaties amend and supplement existing law in
matters such as creating discretionary authority to provide confidential
information in the possession of the government, creating a right of safe
conduct, creating a legal authority to hold persons in custody, creating a
hearsay exception for chain of custody evidence, and removing the discretion to refuse to issue subpoenas for testimony and tangible evidence presently in 28 U.S.C. § 1782.64
B.

SPECIFIC PROVISIONS

Limitations on Assistance
All six treaties under consideration allow judicial assistance to be refused
if the execution of the request would prejudice the security or other essential
interests of the requested State.6 5 The Turkish, Colombian and Italian
59. Colombian report, supra note 2, at 11; Italian Report, supra note 30, at 2; Moroccan
Report, supra note 30, at 1, 2.
60. Netherlands Treaty Article 11(2); Colombian Treaty Article 1(1); Italian Treaty Articles
1(2) and 8(3); Moroccan Treaty Article 7(2); Swiss Treaty Article 1(1); cf. Turkish Treaty
Article 23(1). See also Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 1.
61. See Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 1; Moroccan Report, supra note 30, at 3.
62. Swiss Treaty Article 1(1); Turkish Treaty Article 21(2).
63. Turkish Report, supra note 50, at v.; Message From the President of the United States
Transmitting the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the United States of America and
the Republic of Colombia, Senate Treaty Document No. 11, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., p. v.;
Message From the President of the United States Transmitting the Treaty on Mutual Legal
Assistance Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Together
with a Related Exchange of Notes, Senate Treaty Document No. 16, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., p. v.;
Swiss Report, supra note 42, at 5. But see infra note at 127.
64. Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 11-12. Additionally, Articles 18 and 20 of the
Swiss Treaty concerning business records and testimony to authenticate documents created
new evidentiary rules in providing for the admissability in evidence in U.S. courts. These
articles are based on the foreign official records provision of 28 U.S.C. 1741, 18 U.S.C. 3491, et.
seq., 28 U.S.C. 1732, and Rule 44(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Treaty
With the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in CriminalMatters, S. REP. No. 29, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1976, p. 5 (Statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
65. Swiss Treaty Article 3(1)(a); Turkish Treaty Article 22(l)(b); Netherlands Treaty
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Treaties all permit assistance to be denied if the offense is a purely military
or political offense, 6 6 while the Netherlands permits assistance to be denied
if it is a political offense, the Moroccan if it is a military offense. 67 A request
may be refused under the Swiss, Netherlands, Colombian, Italian and

Moroccan Treaties if it does not conform with the provisions of the treaty in
question. 68 Conditions may be placed on the assistance given in lieu of
denial of a request.

The Swiss Treaty lists a number of offenses for which requests for assistance "shall not apply" under the Treaty. These include political and military

offenses, extradition requests, execution of judgments in criminal matters,
antitrust laws, and violations with respect to taxes, customs duties, gov-

ernmental monopoly charges or exchange control regulations except insofar
as they relate to certain offenses enumerated in the schedules. 70 The nonapplicability of requests for assistance in political, antitrust, and fiscal cases,
however, does not apply when the object of the investigation is an organized

criminal group. 7 ' Information may also be refused to the extent that it
Article 10(1)(a); Colombian Treaty Article 5(1)(a); Italian Treaty Article 5(1)(a); Moroccan
Treaty Article 2(1)(a); cf. European Convention Article 2(b). "Security or other essential
interests" could include, inter alia, national security information, disclosure of the identity of a
key informant, and disclosure of trade or other business secrets which might cause economic
damage to third parties. Italian Report, supra note 30, at 5.
The Swiss Implementing Legislation permits Swiss authorities to appoint a commission of
experts to determine if the essential interests of Switzerland would be prejudiced by.the
granting of a request. Swiss Implementing Legislation, supra note 49, Article 6(1).
66. Turkish Treaty Article 22(1); Colombian Treaty Article 5(1)(b and c); Italian Treaty
Article 5(1)(b); cf. European Convention Art. 1(2), 2(a).
Exactly what constitutes a political offense is stated only in the Turkish Treaty, and even then
in a negative manner: [T]he following offenses shall not be considered political offenses or
offenses connected with a political offense: (a) Offenses for which investigations and proceedings are obligatory for the Contracting Parties under multilateral international agreements; and
(b) Offense against a Head of State or a Head of Government or members of their families."
Turkish Treaty Article 22(2). The Netherlands Report states that the delegates "appreciate
that the United States adheres to the narrower 'British view' of political offenses, while the
Netherlands adheres to the broader 'Swiss view' ". Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 11.
67. Netherlands Treaty Article 10(1)(b); Moroccan Treaty Article 2(1)(b).
The lack of an absolute bar to assistance in "political offense" cases in the Moroccan treaty
was mitigated somewhat in the Executive Report to the Senate, which stated that "the tradition
of witholding our assistance from a foreign country prosecuting persons for improper political
purposes is so firmly rooted in our country that we would view the "public order" exception as a
basis for denying assistance should the occasion arise." Moroccan Report, supra note 30, at 4.
68. Swiss Treaty article 31(1); Netherlands Treaty Article 10(l)(d); Colombian Treaty
Article 4(4); Italian Treaty Article 5(1)(c); Moroccan Treaty Article 2(1)(c). The Turkish
Treaty lacks a specific phrasing to this effect.
Execution of a request may be postponed under the Netherlands, Colombian, Italian and
Moroccan Treaties if it would interfere with an ongoing investigation or legal proceeding in the
requested State. Netherlands Treaty Article 10(2); Colombian Treaty Article 4(3); Italian
Treaty Article 5(3); Moroccan Treaty Article 2(3).
69. Swiss Treaty Article 3(2); Netherlands Treaty Article 10(2); Colombian Treaty Article
5(2); Italian Treaty Article 5(2); Moroccan Treaty Article 5(2).
70. Swiss Treaty Article 2(1).
71. Swiss Treaty Article 2(2); See also infra note 115 and accompanying text.
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relates to the prosecution of a person for acts of which he has been acquitted
or convicted by a final judgment of a court in the requested State.72
Competent Authorities

The Competent Authorities are permitted to communicate directly with
each other, rather than through diplomatic channels,73 and are responsible
for transmitting each request to its appropriate Federal or state agency,
court or other authority for execution. The Competent Authorities are

usually the appropriate head of the justice ministries of the respective
countries. By an order of December 2, 1980, the Attorney General of the
United States delegated such responsibility
to the Assistant Attorney
74
General of the Criminal Division.

Contents and Execution of a Request
The competent officials of the requested state are directed to do everything in their power to execute a request. 75 All the treaties contain similar
requirements for what the contents of a request for assistance shall contain,

including the name of the authority conducting the investigation, the subject
matter of the investigation, a description of the evidence sought and the

purpose for which it is sought, and the name and location of any persons
72. Swiss Treaty Article 3(1). The Netherlands Treaty also allows a request to be denied to
the extent that "the person is immune from prosecution for the offense for which assistance is
requested by reason of the laws of the requested State relating to prior jeopardy." Netherlands
Treaty Article 10(1)(c).
73. The competent authority for the United States under all the treaties is the Attorney
General or his designees; the competent authorities for the Swiss are the Division of Police of
the Federal Department of Justice and Police in Bern, Swiss Treaty Article 28(1); for the
Turkish authorities, the Ministry of Justice, Turkish Treaty Article 38; for the Netherlands, the
Minister of Justice of the Netherlands or the Minister of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles,
Netherlands Treaty Article 14; for the Colombians, the Procurador General de la Nacion,
Colombian Treaty Article 2(1); for the Italians, the Minister of Grace and Justice, Italian
Treaty Article 2(2); for the Moroccans, Minister of Justice or person designated by him,
Moroccan Treaty Article 3(2).
74. Order No. 918-80, 28 CFR 0.64-1 (1983). This responsibility can be redesignated to the
Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Director, Office of International Affairs, Criminal
Division.
75. Swiss Treaty Article 9(3); Turkish Treaty Article 25(4); Colombian Treaty Article 4(1);
Italian Treaty Article 4(l); Moroccan Treaty Article 5(1). However, the treaties are not
intended or understood to authorize the use of the grand jury in the United States for the
collection of evidence abroad. Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 8; Moroccan Report, supra
note 30, at 5. The Swiss Treaty, Article 31(2), states that, "In the case of a request by
Switzerland, this paragraph shall authorize the use of grand juries to compel the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production of documents, records and articles of evidence."
However, according to officials at the Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs,
Criminal Division, discussions were held between the Justice Department and the American
Bar Association at the time of the Senate hearings on the Swiss Treaty, and the Justice
Department agreed that the use of grand juries to collect evidence in Swiss cases would
constitute an abuse of the grand jury and that they would not utilize this provision of the Treaty.
The authors are not aware of any instances where grand juries have been authorized for use in
Swiss or any other foreign criminal cases under the mutual assistance treaties. Under the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, judges do possess similar investigatory powers.
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being sought. 76 Such documents need not be authenticated or legalized. 77

Requests are generally executed according to the laws of the requested
State; however, procedures may be executed according to the laws of the
requesting State, providing such procedures are not specifically prohibited
by the laws of the requested State.78 Completed requests are to be returned
to the requesting State together with all the documents, information and
evidence obtained. 79
Availability of Records

All six treaties permit the requested State to provide publicly available
government documents or records to the requesting State, duly authenticated. 80 The U.S. government has anticipated that the Freedom of Information Act 81 will provide the guidance in determining if government files
are "publicly available"; however, a record would not be deemed available

to the public solely because it is available to a specific individual under the
76. All six treaties have two categories for what the contents of a request should contain, one
category for information which a request "shall" contain, another for information which a
request shall contain "to the extent necessary and possible." The requirements shift from treaty
to treaty. Cf. Turkish Treaty Article 24; Netherlands Treaty Article 13; Colombian Treaty
Article 3; Italian Treaty Article 3; Moroccan Treaty Article 4(2) and 4(3); Swiss Treaty Article
29; European Treaty Article 14(1).
77. Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 12; Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 7; Italian
Report, supra note 30, at 4; Moroccan Report, supra note 30, at 5.
78. Turkish Treaty Article 25(2); Netherlands Treaty Article 12(2); Colombian Treaty
Article 4(2); Italian Treaty Article 4(2) and accompanying Memorandum of Understanding;
Moroccan Treaty Article 5(3); Swiss Treaty Article 9(2); see also Swiss Implementing Legislation, supra note 49, Article 22. Under the Swiss, Turkish, and Netherlands Treaties, search and
seizure may only be executed according to the laws of the requested State. Swiss Treaty Article
9(2); Turkish Treaty Article 27; Netherlands Treaty Article 6(1); cf. European Convention
Article 7(1).
There is some precedent for executing a request in the form of a letter rogatory using
procedures for obtaining evidence not provided for by local procedural law, at least in Italy. See
Gori-Montanelli and Botwinik, International Judicial Assistance-Italy, 9 INT'L LAw 722
(1975).
79. Swiss Treaty Article 32(1); Turkish Treaty Article 39(2); Netherlands Treaty Article
15(1); Colombian Treaty Article 6(1); Italian Treaty Article 6(1). Requests for originals are
made in the Netherlands Treaty Article 15(2); Colombian Treaty Article 6(2); and the Italian
Treaty Article 6(2).
80. Swiss Treaty Article 19; Turkish Treaty Article 26; Netherlands Treaty Article 4(1);
Colombian Treaty Article 14(1); Italian Treaty Article 12(1), 12(3); Moroccan Treaty Article
11(1).
The authentication procedures differ from treaty to treaty. See Swiss Treaty Article 18(4)

(chain certification); Netherlands Report, supra note 30 at 6 (authentication to be done in any
manner stated in the request); Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 19, 20 (authentication by
certificate); Italian Treaty Article 12(3) (Central Authority certification of authenticity). The
Turkish and Moroccan Treaties are silent as to authentication procedures, however under
Article 25(2) and Article 5(3) of the respective Treaties procedures specified by the requesting
State may be followed as long as it is not prohibited under the laws of the requested State, thus
permitting the United States to follow procedures in Rule 902(3) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Moroccan Report, supra note 30, at 6.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
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Privacy Act. 82 Non-publicly available records are to be provided to the same
extent and under the same conditions as it would be available to the
requested State's law enforcement officials; the requested State may exercise discretion as to whether such information is released. 83 Where the
contracting States lack a process equivalent to a subpoena duces tecum,
84

search and seizure will be used to obtain necessary business documents.

Search and Seizure
Search and seizure at the request of the requesting State is permitted in all
six treaties, though such a request must contain such information as would
justify such action under the laws of the requested State. 85 A request from

one country to the United States would thus have to be supported by
probable cause for the action requested; the corresponding evidentiary
standard would be required for a request from the U.S. to one of the
countries. Three of the treaties provide an exception to the U.S. hearsay
rule by allowing evidence seized to be admitted into evidence without
additional proof of chain of custody if the requested State certifies its

condition at the time of seizure (under the Colombian and Italian Treaties),
and a record will be kept of every transfer of an object seized (under the
86
Netherlands Treaty).
Serving Documents
The Competent Authority of the requested State is empowered to cause

service of any document transmitted for this purpose by the requesting

82. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976). See Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 6; Colombian Report,
supra note 2, at 14; Moroccan Report, supra note 30, at footnote 7.
83. Swiss Treaty Article 16(1); Turkish Treaty Article 26(b); Netherlands Treaty Article
4(2); Colombian Treaty Article 14(1); Italian Treaty Article 12(2); Moroccan Treaty Article
11(2); cf. European Convention Article 13.
84. See Netherlands Treaty Article 5; Colombian Treaty Article 15(1); Turkish Treaty
Article 27; Italian Treaty Article 13(1); Moroccan Treaty Article 13; Italian Report, supra note
30, at 8; cf. Swiss Treaty Article 18.
85. Turkish Treaty Article 27; Netherlands Treaty Article 6(1); Colombian Treaty Article
15(1); Italian Treaty Article 13(1); Moroccan Treaty Article 13; implied in Swiss Treaty Article
31(2). This was the subject of an exchange of diplomatic notes between the negotiations of the
Netherlands Treaty agreeing that requests for search and seizure based on "fiscal offenses"
such as taxes, duties, customs and exchange will be "judiciously invoked." See letter of 12 June
1981 from Thomas J. Dunnigan to Ministerie Van Buitenlandre Zaken, and reply letter of 12
June 1981 from Ministerie Zaken to Mr. Dunnigan, reproduced as an Annex to the Netherlands
Treaty, p. 11-15. The delegates also agreed to limit searches and seizures to cases where the
alleged criminal acts constitute crimes in both countries for imprisonment for more than one
year, or if less, is specified in the Annex to the Treaty. This is the only place in the Netherlands
Treaty where the concept of dual criminality comes into play.
86. Netherlands Treaty Article 6(5); Colombian Treaty Articles 15(3), 20(3); Italian Treaty
Article 13(2). The Executive Reports state that these are "narrow exceptions" to the hearsay
rule. Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 4; Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 3.
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State. 87 Request for service of documents requiring the appearance of a
person before authorities in the requesting State 88must be transmitted a
reasonable time before the scheduled appearance.
Taking Testimony in the Requested State
A person in the requested State from whom evidence is sought is bound to
testify and produce documents, records or articles in the same manner and
to the same extent as in criminal investigations or proceedings in the requested State. 89 The treaties specify that the testimony shall be compelled
unless the person has the right to refuse under the laws of the requested
State. 90 The Colombian, Netherlands, Italian and Moroccan Treaties
specify that testimonial privileges under the laws of the requesting State
shall not apply in the execution of a request. 91 All the treaties permit the
presence of the accused, counsel for the accused, and any other person
specified in the request to be present. 92
Taking Testimony in the Requesting State
The treaties permit an individual who has not been detained in the
requested state to appear in person before the appropriate authority of the
87. Swiss Treaty Article 22(1); Turkish Treaty Article 30(1); Netherlands Treaty Article
3(1); Colombian Treaty Article 19; Italian Treaty Article 11(1); Moroccan Treaty Article
15(1).
88. Swiss Treaty Article 22(3); Turkish Treaty Article 29(2); Netherlands Treaty Article
3(2); Colombian Treaty Article 19; Italian Treaty Article 11(2); Moroccan Treaty Article
15(2); similar provision in European Convention Article 7(3). The Swiss, Turkish and Italia-n
Treaties require 30 days advance notice for a personal appearance. The authority of the United
States to serve subpoenas on its own nationals under 28 U.S.C. 1783 is not affected by the
Treaties. Italian Report, supra note 30, at 7.
89. Swiss Treaty Article 10(1); Turkish Treaty Article 25(3); Netherlands Treaty Article
5(1); Colombian Treaty Article 9(1); Italian Treaty Article 14(1); Moroccan Treaty Article
8(1).
90. Swiss Treaty Article 10(1); Turkish Treaty Article 25(3); Netherlands Treaty Article
5(1); Colombian Treaty Article 9(1); Italian Treaty Article 4; Moroccan Treaty Article 8(5).
91. Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 11; Netherlands Treaty Article 5(1); Italian Treaty
Article 14(6); Moroccan Treaty Article 8(2).
Such treaties neither require nor forbid the recognition in the requested States of privileges of
the requesting State. If the witness attempts to assert a privilege unique to the requesting State,
the authorities in the requested State will take the desired evidence and turn it over to the
requesting State along with notice that it was obtained over a claim of privilege. The applicability of the privilege can be determined in that State. Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 7;
Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 11; Italian Report, supra note 30, at 9; Moroccan Report,
supra note 30, at 8.
The Swiss Treaty specifically permits a person to refuse to testify if under the law in either
state he has the right to refuse. Swiss Treaty Article 10(1). The Turkish Treaty requires such
person to testify and produce documents "unless such person has a right to refuse to do so under
the laws of that Party." Turkish Treaty 25(3).
92. Swiss Treaty Article 12(2) (permitting presence of the defendant and/or his counsel with
the consent of the requesting state); Turkish Treaty Article 25(5); Netherlands Treaty Article
5(3); Colombian Treaty Article 9(2); Italian Treaty Article 14(3); Moroccan Treaty Article
8(4); see also Swiss Law on International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters, supra note 49,
Article 21(2).
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requesting State.93 The appearance
of such person however, is obligatory
94
only under the Italian Treaty.
The Swiss, Turkish, Netherlands and Colombian Treaties permit a person
who has been detained in the requested State to be sent to the requesting
State to testify providing that: (1) such person consents; (2) the Central
Authority of the requested State determines that there is no important

reason to oppose the transfer, and (3) the transfer shall not prolong the
custody of the prisoner. 95 Once again, the Italian Treaty does not give the
detainee the option to refuse to testify. 96 The requesting States have an
obligation to keep the transferred person under custody unless the requested State authorizes his release ;97 this also has the effect of creating the
93. Swiss Treaty Article 23(2); Turkish Treaty Article 31(1); Netherlands Treaty Article
3(2); Colombian Treaty Article 10; Italian Treaty Article 15(1); Moroccan Treaty Article 9.
The Colombian Treaty states that the requesting State shall invite the individual to appear in
person before the appropriate authority. This has been interpreted as being non-obligatory on
the part of the witness. Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 12. The Turkish and Swiss Treaty
also notes that a witness who fails to answer a summons shall not be subject to any civil or
criminal forfeiture unless the person enters the territory of the requesting Party and is duly
summoned. Swiss Treaty Article 24; Turkish Treaty Article 31(2).
The Swiss Treaty appears to be the only treaty that specifically states the rights of a detained
individual testifying in the requesting State. If such person agrees to appear before the
requesting State under the Swiss Treaty, he or she may not be compelled to give testimony or
produce documents if under the law in either state he or she has the right to refuse. Swiss Treaty
Article 25(1). However, such a person may be compelled to testify in the United States if a right
to refuse to give testimony or produce evidence is not established, the facts sought are those a
bank would be required to keep secret or are manufacturing or business secrets, the person is
not in any way connected with the offense which is the basis of the request, and the following
conditionds are met: (1) the request concerns the investigation or prosecution of a serious
offense; (2) the disclosure is of importance for obtaining or providing facts which are of
substantial significance for the investigation or proceeding; and (3) reasonable but unsuccessful
efforts have been made in the United States to obtain the evidence or information in other
ways. Swiss Treaty Article 25(2); Article 10(2).
What precisely constitutes a "serious offense" under the Swiss Treaty was the subject of an
exchange of letters between the chief negotiators of the Treaty. See letter of May 25, 1973 from
Dr. Albert Weitnauer, Ambassador of Switzerland, to Shelly Cullom Davis, Ambassador of
the United States , and the reply letter of May 25, 1973 of Ambassador Davis to Ambassador
Weitnauer. Reproduced in the Swiss Treaty, pp. 123-26.
94. Italian Treaty Article 15(1). The Italian Treaty "compel[s] that person to appear and
testify in the Requesting State by means of the procedures for compelling appearances and
testimony of witnesses in the Requested State." Italian Treaty Article 15; see also infra note 153
and accompanying text. The requirement to appear and testify under the Italian Treaty also
differs from the European Convention, Article 8.
95. Swiss Treaty Article 26(2); Turkish Treaty Article 32(1); Netherlands Treaty Article
7(1); Colombian Treaty Article 11(1); similar provision in European Convention Article 11(1).
The Moroccan Treaty lacks a clause to this effect. The Netherlands Treaty also allows a person
detained in the requesting State to be present in the requested State "for purposes of confrontation," which is understood here in the civil law sense of allowing persons giving conflicting
versions of the facts to be brought before a judicial officer. This was apparently added to allow
for the procedural law of the Netherlands. Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 9; similar
provision in Colombian Treaty Article 12.
96. Italian Treaty Article 16(1).
97. Swiss Treaty Article 26(4); Turkish Treaty Article 32(3); Netherlands Treaty Article
7(3); Colombian Treaty Article 11(2); Italian Treaty Article 16(3)(a).
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legal authority for holding a prisoner transferred under the treaty in custody

in the United States. 98 The requesting State shall not decline to return 99a
transferred person solely because such person is a national of that State.
The Colombian, Netherlands, and Italian Treaties specify that the requested State need not initiate extradition procedures in order to have the

person returned.10o
A defendant in custody in one State, who seeks for purposes of confrontation to be present at judicial proceedings in the other State, may be transported to that State, and shall be held and returned under circumstances

similar to the transfer of a detained person as outlined above. 1°1 In these
articles the word "confrontation" is used in the United States constitutional
sense, to provide a mechanism for affording a defendant the right to confront a witness against him where the witness is not willing to travel to the
requesting State. 10 2 Once again, the requested State may not decline to
return the person transferred because such person is a national of that
State. 103
Safe Conduct

Safe conduct is provided to persons transferred under the above circumstances with respect to any act or conviction which preceded the person's
departure from the territory of the requested State.10 4 However, a person
summoned before a proceeding in the requesting State to answer for acts
forming the subject of proceedings against him is permitted similar safe
conduct under the Swiss, Turkish and Netherlands treaties, but only with

respect to acts which are not specified in the request.' 0 5 Safe conduct is
98. Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 5; Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 5; Italian
Treaty Article 16(3)(a).
99. Swiss Treaty Article 26(5); Turkish Treaty Article 32(4); Netherlands Treaty Article
7(4); Colombian Treaty Article 11(3); Italian Treaty Article 16(3).
100. Netherlands Treaty Article 18(3); Colombian Treaty Article 11(2); Italian Treaty
Article 16(3)(d).
101. Swiss Treaty Article 26(1); Turkish Treaty Article 33; Netherlands Treaty Article 8;
Colombian Treaty Article 12; Italian Treaty Article 16(2). The Moroccan Treaty lacks a clause
to this effect.
102. See Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 9.
103. Swiss Treaty Article 26(5); Netherlands Treaty Article 8(3); Colombian Treaty Article
12(3); Italian Treaty Article 16(3)(c). The Turkish Treaty does not contain a specific statement
to this effect.
104. Swiss Treaty Article 27(1); Turkish Treaty Article 34(2); Netherlands Treaty Article
9(1); Colombian Treaty Article 13(1); Italian Treaty Article 17(1); Moroccan Treaty Article
10; identical provision in European Convention Article 12(1); Moroccan Treaty Article 10(1).
105. Swiss Treaty Article 27(2); Turkish Treaty Article 34(2); Netherlands Treaty Article
9(2); identical provision in European Article 12(2). The safe conduct articles in the Colombian
Treaty (Article 19), Italian Treaty (Article 17) and the Moroccan Treaty (Article 10) do not
contain a clause to this effect. The Colombian Report states that:
It is possible that the safe conduct provided for in this article could insure to the benefit of a
criminal defendant. For example, a person in the United States served pursuant to Article 19
with an official document requesting him to appear to answer a criminal charge in Colombia
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provided only with respect to acts which preceded the person's departure
from the requested State; subsequent crimes committed in the requesting
State, such as perjury, can be prosecuted. 106 Moreover, safe conduct ceases
altogether if 10 days after the person receives official notification that his
presence is no longer required,107the person has not left the territory or having
left has voluntarily returned.
Costs
The requested State is generally required to render assistance without
cost to the requesting State. However, most of the treaties require expenses

associated with the execution of a request to be paid by the requesting
State. 108
Limitations on Use

All six treaties provide that evidence obtained under the treaties shall not
be used for purposes other than for those stated in the request without the
prior consent of the requested State. 109 The treaties also provide that when
would be protected by this article were he to so appear. Similarly, a person who is served in
Colombia pursuant to the treaty with some form of notice such as a summons under Rule 4,
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures, would enjoy the protections of this article were he to
appear in response to the summons. However, it is not anticipated that this treaty will serve as
an alternative to the extradition treaty between the United States and Colombia to any
appreciable extent.
Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 13.
106. Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 10; Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 13;
Italian Treaty Article 17(1)(b).
107. Swiss Treaty Article 27(3); Turkish Treaty Article 34(3); Netherlands Treaty Article
9(3); Colombian Treaty Article 13(2); Italian Treaty Article 17(2); Moroccan Treaty Article
10(2); cf. European Treaty Article 12(3) (immunity ceases 15 days from date such person's
presence is not needed). The Netherlands Treaty also permits a person appearing as a witness in
the requesting State to refuse to testify when such person has an obligation or right to do so
under the laws of the requested State and the testimony relates to protected information. Under
the law of the Netherlands, such persons can include the police, physicians, clergymen, social
workers, notaries, tax inspectors, various types of public employees (including intelligence
officials), accounts and attorneys. Netherlands Report, supra note 30, at 10.
108. Turkey and Italy require allowances for a witness or expert invited to appear in the
requested Party, as well as expenses involved in the transfer and return of detained persons, to
be paid by the requesting State. Turkish Treaty Article 41; Italian Treaty Article 7. The
Netherlands Treaty specifies that transfers of persons in custody be paid by the requesting
State. Netherlands Treaty Article 17(2). The Swiss Treaty permits reimbursement to the
requested State for travel expenses, fees of experts, costs of stenographic reporting by other
than salaried government employees, costs of interpreters, costs of translation, and fees of
private counsel. Swiss Treaty Article 34(1); similar provision in Colombian Treaty Article 7.
The Moroccan Treaty requires the Requesting State to pay all of the costs incurred in execution
of the request with the exception of legal fees incurred when execution requires judicial or
administrative action. Moroccan Treaty Article 6.
109. Netherlands Treaty Article 11(2); Colombian Treaty Article 8(1); Italian Treaty Article 8(3); Moroccan Treaty Article 7(2). A long list of exceptions are enumerated to this
limitation in the Swiss Treaty, including where individuals involved in the initial proceeding are
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necessary the requested State may require that evidence and information
provided be kept confidential in accordance with stated conditions except to
0
the extent that disclosure is necessary as evidence in a public proceeding. 11
Authority to provide tax information is found in the Swiss, Netherlands,
Colombian and Italian Treaties.' t1
Special Provisions of the Swiss Treaty
The United States was especially interested in investigating organized
crime cases,"1 2 and Articles 6 through 8 of the Swiss Treaty deal with this

topic. If the two states can agree that the investigation concerns organized
crime figures, a concept defined in Article

6,113

then the requested State

shall provide compulsory assistance "even if the investigation or proceeding
in the requesting State concerns acts which would not be punishable under
the law in the requested State, or which are not listed in the Schedule, or

neither.,

114 Here,

income tax violations are also included as an offense for

which the requested State shall furnish compulsory assistance, but only if the
suspected of having committed another offense for which assistance is mandatory, where
persons are suspected of being accessories to the offense or where the persons are suspected of
organized crime connections. Swiss Treaty Article 5(2); see also Johnson supra note 43, at
353-54.
The Turkish Treaty provides that such evidence may be used in an investigation relating to an
offense other than the offense for which assistance was granted, provided the purpose falls
within the scope of the treaty. Turkish Article 23(2).
110. Swiss Treaty Article 15; Netherlands Treaty Article 11(1); Colombian Treaty Article
8(2); Italian Treaty Article 8(1); Moroccan Treaty Article 7(1); Moroccan Report, supra note
30, at 7. Though the Turkish Treaty lacks a specific reference to confidentiality, the Letter of
Submittal to the President from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance implies that confidentiality was
understood, Turkish Report, supra note 50, at 9, note 4.
111. Swiss Treaty Article 8(4); Netherlands Treaty, Diplomatic Note, June 12, 1981; Colombian Treaty Article 21(3); Italian Treaty Article 8(1); Italian Report, supra note 30, at 6.
The treaties are defined as a 'convention relating to the exchange of tax information' within the
meaning of 26 U.S.C. 6103(k)(4). Netherlands Report, supranote 30, at 6; Colombian Report,
supra note 2, at 17; Italian Report, supra note 30, at 6.
112. See testimony of John C. Keeney, supra note 64, p. 4.
113. Article 6 states that:
[T]he term 'organized criminal group' refers to an association or group of persons combined
together for a substantial or indefinite period for the purposes of obtaining monetary or
commercial gains or profits for itself or for others, wholly or in part by illegal means, and of
protecting its illegal activities against criminal prosecution and which, in carrying out its
purposes, in a methodical and systematic manner:
a. at least in part of its activities, commits or threatens to commit acts of violence or other
acts which are likely to intimidate and are punishable in both States; and
b. either:
(1) strives to obtain influence in politics or commerce, especially in political bodies or
organizations, public administrations, the judiciary, in commercial enterprises, employers'
associations or trade unions or other employees' association; or
(2) associates itself formally or informally with one or more similar associations or groups,
at least one of which engages in the activities described in subparagraph b(1).
Swiss Treaty Article 6(3).
114. Id. Article 7(1).
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person investigated is "reasonably suspected" of being a high-level person
in the organization, the available evidence is insufficient to prosecute the
person without the information requested, and the information provided
will substantially assist in the prosecution of the person under investigation. 11 5 The non-applicability of requests for assistance in political,
antitrust, or fiscal cases does not apply to the investigation of an organized
16
crime group.
Swiss bank records can also be obtained for use in criminal prosecutions in
the United States, since the Swiss Treaty requires production of business
11 7
documents in the requested State at the request of the requesting State.
An exchange of letters upon the signing of the Swiss Treaty stated that "It is
the understanding of the United States government that Swiss bank secrecy
and Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code shall not serve to limit the assistance
provided for by this Treaty, except as provided by paragraph 2 of Article
1."18 In the words of one of the U.S. negotiators, "When the conditions of
the Treaty have been met, bank secrecy is no bar to assistance." 119 The
Swiss Law on International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters, which
went into force in 1983, somewhat altered the traditional Swiss reluctance to
offer international assistance in fiscal cases by allowing "a request for
judicial assistance . . . . [to] be granted if the subject of the proceeding is a
tax fraud.' 120 However, a recent referendum in Switzerland that would
have set aside secrecy rules for all tax inquiries was defeated by a 3-1
margin. 121
Other Treaties and Domestic Laws
The treaties provide that assistance and procedures under the treaties
shall not prevent or restrict any assistance or procedures provided under
other international conventions or arrangements or under the internal laws
of the contracting parties.' 22 Provisions of previously existing agreements
between the United States and the respective countries are thus left
*
123
intact.
115. Id. Article 7(2).

116. Id. Article 2(2).
117. Id. Article 18.
118. Exchange of notes between Shelly Cullom Davis and Dr. Albert Weitnauer, Bern, May
25, 1973, reproduced in Swiss Treaty.
119. See Testimony of John C. Keeney, supra note 64, at 5.

120. Swiss Law, supra note 49, Article 3(3).
121. Swiss Vote to Retain Bank Laws, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 21, 1984.
122. Swiss Treaty Article 38(1); Turkish Treaty Article 42(2); Netherlands Treaty Article
18(1); Colombian Treaty Article 21(1); Italian Treaty Article 19(1); Moroccan Treaty Article
16(1). More limited statements concerning lack of a right of any person to take action in a
criminal proceeding to suppress or exclude evidence (Netherlands Treaty Article 18(2)), and
activities of INTERPOL not being affected by treaty (Italian Treaty Article 19(2)) are also
included.
123. This would include, inter alia, the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on
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Rights of Private Parties

The treaties are not intended for use by non-governmental parties; private individuals may not invoke the treaty in order to obtain evidence from
the other country for use in solely private matters. 124 The Swiss, Colombian,
Netherlands and Moroccan Treaties also state that the treaties do not give
rise to any right on the part of the defendants to obtain judicial relief or to

1 25
suppress or exclude evidence through the treaties except as specified.
Private parties may continue to use letters rogatory where applicable. 126

Narcotic Drugs, 1961, done at Geneva March 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1939, T.I.A.S. 8118, entered
into force for the United States August 8, 1975; the Executive Agreement with Turkey on
Mutual Assistance in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the McDonnell
Douglas Corporation, signed at Washington July 8, 1976, entered into force July 8, 1976, 27
U.S.T. 3419, T.I.A.S. 8371, extensions July 8 and 15, 1980, T.I.A.S. 9810, and August 7 and
December 21, 1982; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances With Protocol, United
States-Netherlands, entered into force February 3, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 247, T.I.A.S. 7061;
Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection with the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, United States-Netherlands, entered into force March
29, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1064, T.I.A.S. 8245, related agreement, March 21, 1979, 30 U.S.T. 2500,
T.I.A.S. 9348; Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, United States-Italy, entered into force
April 12, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. 8374; Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances, United States-Italy, entered into force October 26, 1956, 7 U.S.T. 2977, T.I.A.S. 3678;
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With
Respect to Taxes on Income, United States-Italy, entered into force October 26, 1956, 7 U.S.T.
2999, T.I.A.S. 3679; Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in
Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, United States-Colombia, entered
into force April 22, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1059, T.I.A.S. 8244, related agreements, July 7 and 15,
1980, T.I.A.S. 9809, and August 28 and September 10, 1980, T.I.A.S. 9860; Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on
Income, United States-Morocco, entered into force December 30,1981, T.I.A.S. 10194; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income, United
States-Switzerland, entered into force September 27, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. 2316.
124. Netherlands Treaty Article 18(2); Colombian Treaty Article 1(4); Italian Treaty Article 1(4); Moroccan Treaty Article 1(3); see also Chamblee, supra note 32, at 225.
125. Netherlands Treaty Article 18(2); Colombian Treaty Article 1(5); Moroccan Treaty
Article 16(2); implied in Italian Treaty Article 1(4); Swiss Treaty Article 37(1), contains similar
provisions but with numerous exceptions. A defendant may not take any private action with
regard to failure on the part of one of the Parties to comply with the terms of the Treaty; he or
she is limited to informing the Central Authority of the other state, which may or may not
require an explanation or take action. Swiss Treaty Article 37(3) and exchange of letters
between Ambassador Weitnauer and Davis dated May 25, 1973 and reproduced on pages
110-120 of the Swiss Treaty; see also Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 6, 10-11; Moroccan
Report, supra note 30, at 12.
126. Swiss Treaty Article 38(1); Turkish Treaty Article 42(2); Netherlands Treaty Article
18(1); Colombian Treaty Article 21(1); Italian Treaty Article 19(1); Moroccan Treaty Article
16(1); see also Colombian Report, supra note 2, at 17; Italian Report, supra note 30, at 3;
Moroccan Report, supra note 30, at 11. In Fustok v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 546 F. Supp. 506
(Second Dist. N.Y., 1982), the Court ruled that plaintiff, a nonresident foreign citizen, could
obtain information via letters rogatory for use in a Swiss proceeding to the extent that
documents or witnesses located in New York possess some information relevant to plaintiff's
claims.
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Seizure and Forfeiture of Assets
The Italian Treaty contains a provision allowing the requested State to
seize assets found in that State at the request of the requesting State. The
assets may then be turned over to the requesting State "following such
judicial procedures as would be required under the laws of the requested
State.' ' 127 The Moroccan Treaty contains a similar provision, requiring the
Central Authority of the requested State to "take all appropriate measures
in order that these goods and assets shall not be removed from or dissipated
within its jurisdiction
until the requesting State can complete its pro28
ceedings." 1
Denunciation
All of the treaties contain standard diplomatic language concerning the
procedure for termination of the respective treaty, 29requiring that either
State give six months notice of intent to terminate.
Miscellaneous Provisions
Due to variance in local law and custom, the treaties each contain several
articles not found in the others. The Turkish Treaty, for example, allows the
signatories to furnish information to each other which may be of interest
even if no specific request is made;' 30 the same treaty also requests that
authorities of each party notify the other when a criminal conviction has
been handed down to one of the other's nationals. 131 The Colombian
Treaty, in deference to Colombian law, allows a judge132to identify or examine persons, objects or sites in the requested State.
Appeals
Should there be objections to the request, a review process is provided
under both the Swiss Federal Law on the treaty with the United States of
127. Italian Treaty Article 18. Legislation will be required in both Italy and the United States
to implement this provision. Italian Report, supra note 30, at 12.
128. Moroccan Treaty Article 12. "Criminal narcotics matters include: (a) intentionally

committing any offense against the laws relating to cultivation, production, manufacture,
extraction, preparation, custody, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase,
sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch in transit, transport, importation,
and exportation of dangerous drugs as defined in the laws of each of the two States; and (b) any
set of conspiracy relating to the offenses mentioned in subparagraph (a) above, including any
association of criminals, any supplying of financial operations or services together with any

legally punishable attempt to commit these offenses." Moroccan Treaty Article 12(3). See also
supra note 52.
129. Swiss Treaty Article 41(3); Turkish Treaty Article 44(4); Netherlands Treaty Article
21(1); Colombian Treaty Article 22(3); Italian Treaty Article 21; Moroccan Treaty Article 18.
130. Turkish Treaty Article 35(1), also implied in Swiss Treaty Article 1(3).
131. Turkish Treaty Article 36(1); cf. European Convention Article 22.
132. Colombian Treaty Article 18.
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America on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, and the Swiss Law
on International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters.' 33 A review process is also implied under the Netherlands Law on International Legal
Assistance. 134 Under Article 22 of the Swiss International Judicial Assist-

ance law, orders and decisions of the Federal and Cantonal authorities must
provide notice regarding the availability of court review in order to be valid,

and such notice must specify the nature of the court review allowed, the
reviewing court, and the time period within which court review must be
sought.1 35 Importantly, any person under the Swiss law affected by an order

of the Federal Office who has a legally protected interest in having the order
modified or quashed may challenge the order. 136 Decisions of the Federal

authorities and of the highest Cantonal appellate authorities are subject to
administrative appeal directly to the Federal Tribunal (Swiss Supreme
137
Court).
III. Litigation Under The Treaties

A.

CASE AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE

As of this writing, the treaties with Switzerland, Turkey, and the Nether-

lands have been in effect for seven years, three years, and one year,
133. Swiss Law, supra note 49, Article 25; Swiss Implementing Legislation, supra note 49, at
Articles 16-19.
134. Title X, Article 552o of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Netherlands states that:
1. Insofar as the application referred to in article 552n.3. ["Requests shall be submitted to
the Examining Magistrate by means of a written application setting out the actions required
of the Examining Magistrate"] is made in order to comply with a request from the judicial
authorities of a foreign state, which is founded on a treaty or convention and is admissible, it
shall have the same consequences in law as an application for a preliminary judicial investigation insofar as it concerns:
a. the powers of the Examining Magistrate in relation to the suspects, witnesses and experts
to be heard by him and in relation to the entering of property, the issue of search warrants,
and the seizure of items of evidence;
b. the powers of the Public Prosecutor;
c. the rights and obligations of the persons to be heard by the Examining Magistrate;
d. the assistance of counsel;
e. the actions of the clerk of the court.
Copy on file with the authors.
135. The Swiss Cantonal Authorities are permitted to execute requests for judicial assistance. Swiss Law, supra note 49, Article 16.
136. Id. Article 24; see also Swiss Implementing Legislation, supra note 49, Article 16.
137. Swiss Law, supra note 49, at Article 25; see also Swiss Implementing Legislation, supra
note 49, Article 17. After legal issues are resolved an Advisory Committee can be appointed to
determine if the granting of a request would prejudice the security or essential interests of
Switzerland. Id. Article 6. The Advisory Committee can be appointed at the request of the
executing authority, the central authority, or the person who claims that assistance will infringe
upon his rights to or duties of secrecy. Id. Disclosure of manufacturing or business secrets, or of
facts which a bank must usually keep secret, also prejudice "similar essential interests" of
Switzerland in accordance with Art. 3(1)(a) of the Swiss Treaty. Id. Article 20.
WINTER 1985

214

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

respectively. A search of the literature has revealed only a few published
cases in which the treaties were at issue. In one case, Cardenasv. Smith' 38 a
non-resident alien who alleged that her assets had been frozen in Switzerland as a result of information supplied by the United States under the Swiss
Treaty brought action against the U.S. Attorney General for declaratory
judgment, injunction and damages under the Administrative Procedures
Act. 139 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that it had
no basis for applying due process standards on behalf of the alien with
respect to matters not under the Court's control (i.e. the Swiss bank
account). 140 More at point, the Court held that the Swiss Treaty specifically
precluded review when a Swiss account was frozen, except a review under
Swiss law. The procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act therefore
did not apply.
In another case, U.S. v. Johnpoll, use was made of the Swiss Treaty in
order to gather evidence which led to the conviction of Johnpoll for conspiracy to transport stolen securities. 141Johnpoll alleged that the terms of
the Swiss Treaty had been violated because U.S. prosecutors had made use
of the Swiss evidence in order to attempt to convict Johnpoll of additional
42
customs offenses which were not covered under the terms of the Treaty. 1
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that "As long as the evidence
was used to prosecute violations covered by the Treaty, the government
was not precluded from also prosecuting other related non-treaty
offenses ...., The Court also took note of the fact that under Article
37(a) of the Treaty Johnpoll was expressly barred from asserting
any right to
144
supress or exclude evidence gathered under the Treaty.
The lack of published cases may at first seem surprising, given the large
number of requests for international judicial assistance made through the
U.S. Justice Department, especially from the Swiss government. As of
April, 1984, the Justice Department had received approximately 100 requests for assistance from the Swiss under the Treaty, and had made
approximately 300 requests to the Swiss; approximately 5 requests had been
received from the Netherlands under their treaty, and the U.S. had made
approximately 8 requests to the Netherlands; few, if any, requests have
138. Cardenas v. Smith, 555 F. Supp. 539 (D.C.1982).
139. The relevant section of the Administrative Procedure Act is as follows: "This chapter [5
USC § 701 et. seq.] applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that-(1)
statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1980).
140. The Court, however, left open the possibility that damages could be collected under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, though compliance with the terms of the Act was not alleged by
defendant. See supra note 138 at, 540.
141. U.S. v. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702 (2nd Cir. 1984).
142. Id.at 714. The customs offenses were dismissed by the district court. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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been made either to or from the Turkish government under the Turkish
Treaty. 145
The lack of published cases, however, should not be taken to mean that
there are no issues capable of litigation. One possible explanation is that, as
with extradition cases, many may choose not to contest the request either
because they lack the financial resources or because they feel that litigation
in this country would be fruitless. Yet, while a number of cases involving
mutual assistance have been litigated in Switzerland as high as the Swiss
Federal Council, they appear to be a small percentage of the whole. 146 One
commentator has speculated that potential U.S. defendants may be failing
to retain proper
Swiss counsel and to alert third parties to their rights under
14 7
Swiss law.

B.

CONCERNS RAISED

One unpublished case raises a number of interesting questions concerning
the process by which search and seizure is carried out under the Netherlands
Treaty. In United States ex. rel. PublicProsecutorof Rotterdam, Netherlands
v. Richard Jean Van Aalst,1 48 a defendant's premises were searched pur-

suant to a search warrant issued by a U.S. magistrate in Orlando, Florida
based on an affidavit signed by a special agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration. On a motion for evidentiary hearing to suppress evidence
and/or return of property, the defendant alleged that the cablegram received from Dutch authorities to the U.S. Department of Justice requesting
a search of defendant's property was not a judicial statement under oath
before a judge in the Netherlands, as required under Article 4 of the instant
Treaty. Defendant further alleged that the search warrant did not contain
probable cause and did not meet the legal requirements for a search warrant
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and federal case law. Finally, the defendant alleged that Section 4 of Article 6 of the Treaty is an
145. Personal communication to the authors by Larry Chamblee, Esq., Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, May 1, 1984. According to an
earlier article, approximately 75% of the requests made to the Swiss government by the United
States were for the purpose of obtaining Swiss business or banking records. Frei and Ralston,
Swiss-American Cooperation in Criminal Investigations, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, 22

(January 1982).
146. See Chamblee, supra note 32, at 204; Statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, House
Judiciary Committee, Concerning Foreign Evidence Rules Amendments, April 25, 1984,
Appendix pp. 2-5; Swiss Supreme CourtOpinion ConcerningJudicialAssistance in the Santa Fe
Case, 22 INT'L LEG. MAT. 785 (1983).

147. Shine, "Transnational Litigation in Criminal Matters: A Case Study of the Interconex
Prosecution," in TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 32, at 561.
148. United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, Case No.
84-67-MISC-018.
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unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers in that judicial powers
149
are taken away from the judicial branch by an act of the executive branch.
The original request for a hearing, as0 well as a subsequent request for a
rehearing, was denied by the judge.15
One other explanation for the dearth of published cases is that there has
been an increasing tendency for the Justice Department to avoid their use in
complex cases where the defendants may raise objections under local law
that could delay the obtaining of evidence for a year or more. The government has complained bitterly about these delays in the past. 151 In one recent
unpublished case, United States of America v. George N. Meros et al. 152, a

U.S. magistrate granted a motion to take depositions in Switzerland pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. When
defendants hired Swiss counsel to challenge the taking of the depositions,
the Assistant Attorney General for the case in the United States filed a
motion for injunction seeking to prevent the defendant and his counsel from
taking any action in Switzerland which would interfere with the taking of the
depositions. The magistrate subsequently issued the order and enjoined the

defendants and their U.S. counsel from asserting any rights under Swiss law
or in any way interfering with the taking of the depositions. The Assistant
U.S. attorney relied partially on the argument
that such motions were
53
causing delays in obtaining evidence abroad.
149. Article 6, paragraph 4 of the Netherlands Treaty states that: "A request to the United
States for a search and seizure shall be accompanied by a statement made under oath before, or
by a judge in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which shall establish good cause to believe that
an offense has taken place or is about to take place and that evidence of the offense is to be
found on the persons or the premises to be searched, and shall provide a precise description of
the person or premises to be searched. Such a statement shall be considered in the United States
in lieu of an affidavit sworn before a United States judicial officer."
150. Personal communication to the authors by Jeff Kay, Esquire, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
July 15, 1984.
151. Foreign Evidence Rules Amendments-H.R. 5406 and S. 1762, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
April 25, 1984. (Testimony of Mark Richards, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice).
152. United States of America v. George N. Meros et al., United States District Court,
Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Case No. 84-76-CR-T-8.
153. United States v. Carver, et al. Criminal No. 81-342 (D.D.C., Nov. 10, 1981) (authentication of documents held up for four years by defendants filing appeals in Swiss court), United
States v. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702 (2nd Cir. 1984) (two year delay in obtaining evidence under
Swiss Treaty, see supra note 141 and accompanying text), Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United
States of America, 707 F.2d 663 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 3555 (1983) (one + year
delay in obtaining documents), U.S. v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1981) (delay in excess
of one year to obtain bank records in Switzerland).
When the Assistant Attorney General felt that the defendant was not complying with the
terms of the Order, he filed a Motion requesting the court to issue a bench warrant and an Order
to Show Cause why the defendants and their attorneys should not be held in criminal contempt.
The Motion was dismissed by the court. United States of America v. George N. Meros et al.,
supra note 152.
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In another unpublished case, U.S. v. Carveret al. 154, U.S. District Court
Judge Norma Holloway Johnson ordered that the defendants "shall not,
either directly or indirectly, attempt to frustrate this Court's order granting
leave to take depositions or this Court's requests for international judicial
assistance to the jurisdictions of Bermuda, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland
by seeking to relitigate in those jurisdictions the propriety of this Court's
orders, including any issue properly within the scope of Rule 15, Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure .

. . .

155 The Judge went on to state that any

attempt to so frustrate the execution of the Court's orders may constitute a
waiver of the right to confrontation.
Despite these pronouncements, a recently enacted law specifically envisions and anticipates that parties will challenge the taking of evidence in
foreign countries. The bill was considered separately by the Senate and
House of Representatives but passed as a part of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984.156 The foreign evidence sections of the Act attempts to
ameliorate several difficulties United States authorities have been having
with regard to the gathering of evidence abroad, including establishing an
exception to the hearsay rule regarding the authenticity of foreign business
records, creating an exception to the Speedy Trial Act to specifically exclude
reasonable periods of delay resulting from efforts to obtain evidence from
abroad for use at trial, and extending the statute of limitations for the time
needed to obtain information from abroad (but in no case for more than
three years). 157 The new law also requires any party that submits a pleading
or other document to a court in a foreign country in opposition to an official
request for evidence to serve notice on the other party at the same time.
S. Cass Weiland, Chief Counsel for the Committee on Government Affairs
of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, noted in discussing the new legislation prior to its enactment that "Nothing can or would be
done to prohibitthe subject's access to foreign courts but it is reasonable to

require him to give notice of his action to his litigation opponent in the
United States-be it the government or a private litigant"' 58 (emphasis
added).
At the same time, U.S. courts are becoming more sympathetic to the
issuance of subpoenas to obtain foreign bank and tax information regardless
154. U.S. v. Carver, et al., Criminal No. 81-342 (D.D.C., Nov. 10, 1981).
155. Id. at 4.
156. H.J. Res. 648, Title II, Chapter XII, Part K, P.L. 98-473, October 4,1984, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. Signed by President Reagan on October 12, 1984, and became law on November 10,
1984.
157. Foreign Evidence Rules Amendments-H.R. 5406 and S. 1762 (Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
April 25, 1984).
158. Weiland, "Legislative Perspective on Problem ofTransnational Evidence Gathering,"
in TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 32, at 580.
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of the conflict of law questions involved and regardless of the fact that
procedures compatible with foreign law are often available.15 9
Ironically, U.S. courts have bristled at attempts of foreign courts to limit
the rights of appellants here through injunctions in foreign courts. The
controversy surrounding Laker Airways provides a case in point. In 1982,
Laker filed an antitrust suit in U.S. courts against six major airlines and two
other corporations charging them with a predatory scheme to drive it out of
business. 160 The four foreign airlines named as defendants in the suit then
filed suit in the Court of Queen's Bench in London seeking a declaration of
non-liability to Laker and an order enjoining Laker permanently from
continuing its action in the United States. They later were granted a permanent injunction in the Court of Appeal after the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry issued an Order under the British Protection of Trading
Interests Act. 16 1The U.S. District Court for the District of Colombia, upon
reviewing the proceedings to date, lamented "the increasing intrusiveness of
the English orders" 162 and after noting that the plaintiff was now effectively
precluded from asserting his rights under U.S. law, the Court appointed an
63
amicus to advise it on the means by which the lawsuits could be revived. 1
Though the British injunction was eventually dissolved by the House of

159. See "Courts Aid Officials' Efforts to Get Offshore Bank Data of U.S. Firms," The Wall
Street Journal, July 24, 1984; see also Marc Rich & Co., A. G. v. United States of America, 707
F.2d 663 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 3555 (1983); United States v. Bank of Nova
Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 3086 (1983); United States v.
Vetco, Inc., 664 F.2d 1324, modified, 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1098
(1981); United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940, 97 S. Ct.
354, 50 L.Ed. 309 (1976); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera
Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Grand Jury No. 81-2, 550 F.Supp. 29 (W.D.
Mich. N.D. 1982); but see, Societe Internationale Power Participations Industry v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 78 S. Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958) (dismissal of plaintiff's complaint could not be
imposed where plaintiff had acted in good faith, was unable to comply because of foreign law,
and was entitled to a hearing on the merit with regard to particulars alleged in suit); United
States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983), (Court denied enforcement of an IRS summons directed to First National Bank seeking disclosure of records which
were located in Greece and concerned Greek nationals). U.S. courts have generally employed
a balancing test in determining whether they should exercise jurisdiction over foreign documents. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965),
§ 40; RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TH E UNITED STATES (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 1982), § 420.
160. See United States: Judicial Proceedings in Antitrust Action of Laker Airways Limited,

23 INT'L LEG. MAT. 517 (1984). Four other airlines were subsequently added as defendants. Id.
note 3 at 590.
161. Id. at 518. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act appears at 21 INT'L LEG. MAT.

834 (1982).
Other countries have also enacted similar protective legislation to guard against encroachments of extraterritorial jurisdiction, including France, Australia, Canada, and Germany. See
Foreign Blocking Statutes, in TRANSNATIONAi LITIGATION, supra note 32, at 1329.
162. Id. at 596.
163 Id.
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Lords, 164 the Laker case represents precisely the reverse of the situation in
the Meros and Carvercases, where U.S. courts prevented defendants from
asserting rights guaranteed under foreign law.
At least one government, that of Switzerland, has lodged several objections to what they perceive to be the overly aggressive stance of the Justice
Department in pursuing evidence abroad. In a controversy involving Credit
Suisse, for example, the New York branch of that company resisted a U.S.
District Court judge's order to turn over evidence, causing the judge to
threaten to freeze the assets of the New York branch office until a compromise was reached. 165 In a tax evasion scheme involving Marc Rich and Co.,
A.G., U.S. officials successfully subpoenaed documents directly rather than
through the Swiss Treaty, causing the Swiss government to call a news
conference at the United Nations to protest the maneuver and to file an
amicus curiaebrief on Rich's behalf. 166 The Swiss are clearly disturbed that,
at least in some instances, the United States is not following the terms of the
agreements on mutual assistance worked out over the last decade. 167 The
Swiss government, in filing its amicus curiae brief in the Marc Rich case,
noted that, "Despite repeated assurances from the Government of Switzerland that a request for intergovernmental assistance would likely lead to
release of most of the documents within a short period of time, the United
States prosecutors have refused to make any such request."' 168 Criticism of
164. United States of America v. George N. Meros et al.,
United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, C.A. No. 84-3721, Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, at 4, 5.
165. See SEC v. American Institute Counselors, Inc., et al., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,388
(D.D.C. Dec. 30, 1975). See also Note, Extraterritoriality: Swiss Supreme Court Refuses
United States Request for Information Concerning Insider Trading, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J., at
note 19 (1984).
166. See War breaks out over rich man's tax return, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 1983, at 83; amicus
curiae brief of Swiss government in Marc Rich & Co., A. G. v. United States of America, 736
F.2d 864 (2nd Cir. 1984), Docket 84-6033.
167. See Letter of Anton Heger, Ambassador of Switzerland, to Judge Leonard B. Sand, re
Grand Jury Investigation of Marc Rich and Co., A.G., dated September 19, 1983, reprinted in
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 32, at 744. Dr. Lionel Frei, Chief, Section of International Assistance and Police Matters of the Federal Department of Police in Bern, Switzerland
has expressed the view that "Ifconflicts of law arise, they should be solved by mutual
consultations and compromise and not by unilateral action." Frei, Swiss Secrecy Laws and
Obtaining Evidence from Switzerland, in TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 32, at 33.

Besides the Swiss Treaty, an agreement was also negotiated concerning assistance in insider
trading, which was outside the scope of the Swiss Treaty. See Switzerland-United States:
Memorandum of Understandingto Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading, August 31, 1982, 22
INT'L LEG. MAT. 1 (1983).

Other countries have also expressed concerns about unilateral actions by U.S. authorities.
See e.g. April and Fried, Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in TransnationalLitigation: A
Canadian View, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L LAW & POL. 961 (1984).

168. Amicus curiae brief of Swiss government in Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States of
America, supra note 166, at 8. The brief also noted that Swiss law prohibited the production of
documents other than through an official request of intergovernmental asistance. Id. at 17.
There is evidence that such protests are occasionally heeded. In the Executive Agreement
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the U.S. government's 169
handling of that case has extended as high as the
Swiss Federal Council.
Concerns also exist over the manner in which admissability of evidence is
handled under the treaties. Ameican authorities must consider the hearsay
rule, provisions on authentication, and the confrontation rights of the
defendant if the evidence is being gathered for trial purposes. 170 Two legal
practitioners, Tigar and Doyle, 1 71 note that under Article 12 of the Swiss
Treaty the Swiss government's right to withold portions of records as being
subject to overriding concerns over secrecy may cause problems regarding
the admissability of the records in question. Exclusion of the witness and his
counsel from the proceedings raises further questions under the federal
"rule of completeness"' 172 and also perhaps under the public trial and
confrontation clauses. 173 Exceptions to the hearsay rule may pose significant
problems if the defendant seeks to cross-examine the custodian of such a
document to determine whether it in fact meets the business records standard as defined in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).
Additional questions are raised by the creation of an international subpoena under the Italian Treaty, 174 an addition unique to that Treaty. The
recently concluded between the United States and the Cayman Islands, the U.S. agreed not to
attempt to enforce any federal subpoena in the United States with regard to documents in the
Caymans without the prior agreement of either the United Kingdom government or the
Cayman government. See "Executive Agreement," supra note 3, at paragraph 6.
169. "In response to a question posed by a member of the National Assembly, the Swiss
Federal Council stated: 'The attitude of the Federal Council in the Marc Rich case [In re Marc
Rich and Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983). See also 736 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1984)], should
have clearly shown that it is not ready to tolerate the unilateral application of American Law to
factual situations of an international character.'" United States of America v. George N. Meros
et al., United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, C.A. No. 84-3721, Motion for
Expedited Appeal, note I at 12.
170. Federal Rules of Evidence 801-04 (hearsay), 901-03 (authentication and identification)
(1984).
171. Tigar and Doyle, supra note 4, at 67-68.
172. The "rule of completeness" is codified in Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
(1984): "When a writing of recorded statement or part therof is introduced by a party, an
adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it."
173. Amendment VI of the U.S. Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
174. Article 15 of the Italian Treaty provides:
Taking Testimony in the Requesting State
1. The Requested State, upon request that a person in that State appear and testify in
connection with a criminal investigation or proceeding in the Requesting State, shall compel
that person to appear and testify in the Requesting State by means of the procedures for
compelling the appearance and testimony of witnesses in the Requested State if:
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Treaty would require an American citizen to be removed to Italy to testify in
connection with a criminal investigation, as well as permit American authorities to subpoena persons within Italian jurisdiction. If one refuses, he is
subject to the same sanctions under U.S. law as if he had failed to appear in
similar circumstances in the United States. 175 Such sanctions, however, may
not include removal of that person to Italy. In creating an alternative form of
rendition, a number of questions arise concerning the rights of witnesses.
While a witness would presumably possess all the rights he would in the
United States, including the right to have a court modify or quash a
subpoena, 176 questions arise concerning the testimonial privileges of the
witness while testifying in Italy, and the procedures for the resolution of
disputes which could arise in the course of testifying.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there remains the question of
accessibility to the treaty mechanism on the part of private parties. The
treaties would seem to indicate that the U.S. negotiators sought to exclude
completely the right of private parties to challenge or exclude evidence
under the treaties; 177 whether this would be upheld in court is unclear.
While the government may gain access to certain records to prosecute a
defendant, it is not at all clear that the government could be compelled to
make a request for information that contained exculpatory evidence.
Theoretically, a defense attorney can request the relevant U.S. court to
instruct the Department of Justice to make a request for the defense, at least
under the Swiss Treaty. 178 However, such requests are possible only after
the indictment has been endorsed and only if the court so approves.179
Additionally, the defense must comply with the terms of the treaty in
making such requests, including describing the need for the evidence
sought, raising the possibility that the defense will be required to reveal
much of its strategy even if it can gain access to the treaty. 18 In one case,
a. the Requested State has no reasonable basis to deny the rquest;
b. the person could be compelled to appear and testify in similar circumstances in the
Requested State; and
c. the Central Authority of the Requesting State certifies that the person's testimony is

relevant and material.
2. A person who fails to appear as directed shall be subject to sanctions under the laws of
the Requested State as if that person had failed to appear in similar circumstances in that
State. Such sanctions shall not include removal of the person to the Requesting State.
175. Failure to obey a subpeona may be deemed a contempt of court. F.R. Crim. P. 17(g)
(1984), F.R. Civ. P. 45(f) (1984). There are two types of contempt: civil and criminal.
"Representation of Witnesses Before Federal Grand Juries," National Lawyers Guild, 1982,
p. 444. U.S. courts have power to punish criminal contempt, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976), and civil
contempt, 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976).
176. Italian Report, supra note 30, at 10. See also F.R. Cr. P. 17(c) (1984), F.R. Civ. P. 45(b)
(1984).
177. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
178. Swiss Treaty Art. 28(2); see also Frei, supra note 167, at 17.
179. Frei, supra note 167, at 17.
180. Swiss Treaty Art. 29; Frei, supra note 167, at 17.
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U.S. v. Sindona, 181 a request for assistance under the treaty with Switzerland was made by the defense and the court ordered that it should be
complied with or the case would be dismissed. The Department of Justice
complied with the request.
IV. Conclusion

The U.S. treaties on mutual assistance in criminal matters represent a step
forward in international relations in that they offer rules and procedures that
greatly simplify previous practices and offer an alternative to questionable

techniques such as the kidnapping of information in foreign countries and
attempting to enforce U.S. subpoenas in foreign jurisdictions. Given this
fact, the treaties would seem to have a bright future; indeed, negotiations
are currently underway with Jamaica, Canada, Belgium, West Germany,
the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and Thailand regarding the conclusion of

similar agreements. 182 Their continuing proliferation would seem to assure
that the concerns of Dr. Gerhard Mueller expressed over twenty years ago
that "American courts neither give nor receive (nor ask for) adequate
184
' 183 will at last be addressed.
judicial assistance in criminal matters"

The chief concern of the authors is the possible use of the treaties to

circumvent U.S. due process guarantees, 185 the lack of access to the treaty
181. U.S-. v. Sindona, 636 F.2d at 892 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Kenney, Structures and
Methods of International and Regional Cooperation in Penal Matters, 29 N.Y. LAW SCHOOL L.
REV. 65 (1984).
182. See Chamblee supra note 32, at 223; see also Bahamas Sets Talks on Secrecy, JoURN. OF
COMM., December 22, 1983.
183. Mueller, supra note 12, at 197.
184. International judicial assistance in civil matters is also becoming more commonplace.
See Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters ("Hague Service Convention"), done at The Hague November 15, 1965,
entered into force for the United States February 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T.361, T.I.A.S. 6638, 658
U.N.T.S. 163; Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
done at The Hague March 18, 1970, entered into force for the United States October 7, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. 7444. These Conventions also allow procedures to be followed under the
terms of the Conventions rather than utilizing the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1781 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782, respectively. On June 25, 1984, President Reagan transmitted the Inter-American
Convention on Letters Rogatory to the Senate for its advice and consent. Inter-American
Convention on Letters Rogatory, With Protocol, Senate Treaty Document 98-27, 98th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1984. When ratified, the Convention will establish a level of international judicial
cooperation in civil and commercial proceedings among contracting states of the Organization
of American States (OAS) analogous to that which now exists among contracting States to the
Hague Service Convention, which has only been ratified by one other OAS state in addition to
the United States. Id. at I.
For a summary of U.S. procedures involving the Justice Department with respect to execution of foreign requests regarding commercial and civil matters, see Weiner, In Search of
International Evidence: A Lawyer's Guide Through the U.S. Department of Justice, 58 NOTRE

60 (1982).
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185. A treaty which conflicts with constitutional rights is invalid. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957).
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mechanism on the part of the defendants, and the use of federal subpoenas
to obtain access to foreign documents when mutual assistance treaties are
either absent or their utilization does not produce results quickly enough.
The Department of Justice, together with the judiciary, bar associations,
other concerned organizations, and private counsel, should carefully scrutinize the development and execution of the treaties to insure that rights
recognized under law are not violated or circumvented.
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